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A
widely recognized critical function of a central bank
is to be a lender of last resort, particularly in times
of financial distress. Walter Bagehot—a 19th century
English intellectual—summarized the lender of last resort
function with the dictum “lend freely at a high rate, on good
collateral.” In response to the mortgage-related distress in
financial markets, the Fed has implemented a number of
new lending programs. Prominent among these is the
Term Auction Facility (TAF), through which the Federal
Reserve Banks auction funds to depository institutions.
The TAF may not reflect Bagehot’s views on the role of a
lender of last resort—and neither may recent traditional
discount window lending.
Since the Fed’s inception, banks have been allowed to
borrow from Reserve Banks’ discount windows. Once an
important source of bank reserves, borrowing at the discount
window has diminished over time: After substantial borrow-
ing by then-troubled Continental Illinois Bank in early 1984,
depository institutions became more reluctant to borrow
from the Fed and borrowing fell
to tertiary levels. Consequently,
few depository institutions bor-
rowed from the discount window
during the early months of the
financial market turmoil in 2007.
To provide more liquidity to
depository institutions (and with
the hope of reducing their reluc-
tance to borrow at the discount
window), on December 12, 2007,
the Fed announced the establish-
ment of a temporary Term
Auction Facility. Under the TAF,
the Fed supplies a predetermined
amount of funds to depository
institutions for 28-day (two main-
tenance periods) and 84-day
terms against the same collateral
used to secure conventional dis-
count window loans. The funds
are auctioned. The Fed sets a
minimum bid rate; however, all loans are made at the low-
est rate (the stop-out rate) that exhausts the amount of funds
being auctioned. The initial auction was for $20 billion;
the most recent auction was $150 billion.
By contrast, discount window loans are initiated by
depository institutions that come to the Fed and request a
loan. Discount window loans adhered to Bagehot’s dic-
tum—lend at a high rate—in that the primary credit rate
was set at 100 basis points above the Federal Open Market
Committee’s target for the federal funds rate. But under
the TAF, depository institutions compete for funds by
indicating the amount they wish to borrow and the rate
that they are willing to pay.
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Funds TargetFigure 1 shows the primary
credit rate, the 1-month CD and
eurodollar rates, and the stop-out
rates for each of the 24 TAF auc-
tions: The stop-out rate has been
at or below CD and eurodollar
rates and often below the primary
credit rate. Hence, rather than
lending at a penalty as Bagehot
recommended, the TAF has pro-
vided funds at rates that have gen-
erally been low relative to rates
that depository institutions would
have had to pay otherwise. Indeed,
the rate on the $150 billion auc-
tion held on October 6 was 1.39
percent, 86 basis points below
the then primary credit rate of
2.25 percent and 36 basis points
below the new primary credit
rate of 1.75 percent established
on October 8.
The figure also shows that until recently the primary
credit rate was a penalty rate relative to rates on CDs or
eurodollars. The primary credit rate remained a penalty rate
despite the Fed reducing the spread between it and the funds
rate target from 100 to 50 basis points on August 17, 2007.
On March 18, 2008, the Fed reduced the spread further to
just 25 basis points. On the next day, the Fed reduced the
primary credit rate 75 basis points by reducing the funds
rate target by that amount. As a result of these actions, the
primary credit rate has since been consistently lower than
the CD and eurodollar rates.
Figure 2 shows the average daily level of primary credit
outstanding for weeks ending the date shown (left scale)
and the average daily percentage point difference between
the primary credit rate and the 1-month CD rate for the
same weeks (right scale). The primary credit rate is a penalty
rate when the difference is positive and a subsidy rate when
it is negative. The figure suggests that the reluctance by
depository institutions to borrow from the Fed—which
had characterized discount window borrowing since mid-
1984—appears to have vanished. Indeed, primary credit
has recently been at levels not experienced historically at
the discount window. The strong negative correlation
(–0.84) between these series suggests that depository insti-
tutions borrow primarily when the primary credit rate is a
subsidy rate. ￿
Economic SYNOPSES Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis      2
research.stlouisfed.org
Figure 2
Primary Credit Outstanding and the Spread Between the Primary Credit Rate 
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Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.